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ABSTRACT 
 
The North American SynchroPhasor Initiative Network (NASPInet) aims to provide a 
secure and reliable communication infrastructure for sharing phasor measurement unit 
(PMU) data among utilities, balancing authorities, reliability coordinators and other pow-
er grid entities. Since the data is secured using cryptographic primitives such as encryp-
tion and message authentication codes, it is critical to ensure fault tolerance of the key 
management infrastructure that the cryptographic primitives rely on.  Since an entity 
might be sharing its data with multiple other power grid entities, group cryptographic 
primitives are more efficient and thus the keys must be distributed and managed among a 
group of authorized entities. To make group key management (GKM) fault tolerant, we 
must eliminate its single point of failure – the key distributor (KD). To ensure that the 
system can keep running even if the KD experiences failure, we maintain its replicas, 
which can replace it whenever needed. If not managed efficiently, replication can lead to 
problems like lack of consistency between replicas, deadlocks, and decreased throughput 
of operations. Hence, it is necessary to coordinate operations. Instead of performing co-
ordination from scratch, it is much more efficient to make use of a coordination service 
that has proven to be successful in doing so for other applications. In this thesis, we pro-
pose the design of an interface that enables the group domain of interpretation (GDOI) 
group key management protocol to replicate its KD, the group controller/key server 
(GCKS), by using the ZooKeeper open source coordination service.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wide-area situational awareness (WASA) has been recognized as a key enabling func-
tionality for smart grids. Key enablers of WASA are the time synchronized and precise 
grid measurements called synchrophasor measurements. These measurements are made 
possible by phasor measurements units (PMUs), GPS clock synchronized measurement 
devices capable of measuring the current and voltage phasors in the power grid. Recog-
nizing the potential of enhanced data collection by PMUs, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), electric utilities, feder-
al and private researchers, academics, and others have started a collaborative effort, the 
North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) [1]. 
 
One of NASPI’s aims is to provide a data communications infrastructure called the 
NASPI network (NASPInet) which enables utilities or control centers to share the data 
collected from hundreds of thousands of PMUs across the grid. PMU data consists of 
voltage and current phase angles, and rate of change of frequency, and is sampled 30-120 
times per second. Hence, PMUs give much more direct access to the state of the grid than 
conventional SCADA systems which sample data on voltage and current magnitudes 
every 2-4 seconds. The PMU data is sent to phasor data concentrators (PDCs) at substa-
tions or control centers to be used for synchrophasor applications. The data then may be 
shared by the control center with its reliability coordinator and other control centers to 
enable WASA. NASPInet) aims to enable secure sharing of PMU data.  
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The proposed architecture of NASPInet [1, 2], as shown in Fig.1, was designed keeping 
in mind the importance of wide-area sharing of PMU data. NASPInet will be composed 
of phasor gateways (PGWs), which shall be the sole access point of entities like utilities 
and monitoring centers, and a data bus (DB) which includes a wide area network (WAN). 
The DB enables the PMU data to be shared among hundreds of PGWs. The data is used 
for applications ranging from feedback control to situational awareness. It is, therefore, of 
prime importance to secure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PMU data to 
ensure the reliability of applications that use it and hence that of the power grid. We give 
a brief description of the aforementioned security properties and methods to implement 
the same. 
 
 
Figure 1: NASPInet conceptual architecture [2] 
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Confidentiality of data pertains to preventing it from being accessed by unauthorized 
entities. The PMU data contains sensitive information about the state of the grid which 
can be abused by malicious eavesdroppers to disrupt grid operation. These malicious 
agents may also modify the data, thus compromising its integrity and leading applications 
or operators into making catastrophic decisions. Hence, the PMU data must be protected 
end-to-end, i.e., from the sender PGW to the receiver PGW. The security of data, as de-
fined above, depends on trust management, and key establishment and management. For 
example, only trusted entities should be allowed admission into the network over which 
data is transmitted. In order to meet this requirement, every data-requesting entity must 
be authenticated by verifying its digital credentials. Similarly, end-to-end confidentiality 
and integrity depend on pre-established cryptographic keys between the source PGW and 
the destination PGW. 
 
Since the confidentiality and integrity of data depends on distribution of cryptographic 
keys for encrypting and decrypting data, the key management infrastructure should be 
fault tolerant. For a system to be fault tolerant, it should not have any single point of fail-
ure; i.e., it should be able to function even if any individual component undergoes failure. 
In regular key management protocols, the central entity responsible for distributing the 
keys, known as the key distributor (KD), is a point of failure. If the KD goes down, send-
ers will not have access to new keys for encrypting data, forcing the sender to either use 
old keys or stop sending data, thus compromising either security or availability. One so-
lution to this problem is replication of the KD, i.e., maintaining replicas to take its place 
in the event of its failure. Large Internet companies like Google and Facebook utilize 
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large scale computing systems, known as web-scale architectures, to manage large vol-
umes of data. These architectures are designed to be flexible, they provide near linear 
scaling, and they are leveraged to allow computations and optimizations. Hence, they not 
only provide reliability, but also deliver high performance. ZooKeeper is one of the ser-
vices that enables these functionalities. 
 
In this thesis, we propose the design for an interface that enables the group domain of 
interpretation (GDOI) key management protocol to replicate its key server by using the 
ZooKeeper coordination service. The thesis shall unfold as follows. In Chapter 2, we give 
a brief description of key management and the methodologies to perform the same. In 
Chapter 3, we discuss GDOI, a group-key management protocol, to be used for providing 
cryptographic keys to the PGWs. In Chapter 4, we elucidate the importance of replicating 
the GDOI KD, the group controller key server (GCKS). We then explain the important 
functionalities required for proper replication. In Chapter 5, we introduce ZooKeeper as a 
viable option to provide replication for the GCKS. In Chapter 6, we describe the design 
of the interface that allows running GDOI on ZooKeeper. In Chapter 7, we analyze the 
advantages of using ZooKeeper for replication over doing so ourselves. Finally, in Chap-
ter 8, we present our conclusions and propose future work in the area. 
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2. KEY MANAGEMENT 
 
Secure communications systems employ sophisticated protocols to protect the privacy of 
the data exchanged on it. These protocols involve the use of cryptographic primitives 
such as encryption and cryptographic message authentication codes. These primitives 
rely on cryptographic keys and they must be established between the sender and the re-
ceiver. The process of establishing these cryptographic keys between two entities and 
then maintaining them over their life cycle is called key management. For example, the 
sender may encrypt the data using a cryptographic key before transmitting it to the re-
ceiver. The keys that encrypt the network traffic (data) are called traffic encrypting keys 
(TEKs). Since the receiver must have the TEK to decrypt the message and retrieve the 
data, TEKs must also be transmitted on the network. Since malicious entities can easily 
access data without breaking the cryptographic algorithms if they gain access to the 
TEKs, it is of utmost importance to protect the TEKs as well. To prevent the TEKs from 
being compromised during transfer, they themselves are encrypted with key-encryption 
keys (KEKs). These KEKs in turn may be established using long-term keys that estab-
lished using out-of-band mechanisms. Since the amount of traffic constituted by TEKs is 
much smaller than the amount of traffic constituted by the actual data, the KEKs do not 
have to be changed that often and are distributed less frequently than TEKs. 
 
2.1 PKM (Pairwise Key Management) 
Entities that use a symmetric cryptographic algorithm share a key to communicate se-
curely. The sender can transmit the key to the receiver on a secure or out-of-band channel 
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other than the channel used to transmit data. It could also split the key into multiple seg-
ments and send them over different channels. The receiver can then combine them to 
recover the original key. 
 
Since every pair of users must exchange keys, the total number of key exchanges re-
quired in an n-entity network is n(n – 1)/2, or O(n2). This is manageable in small net-
works, but becomes a problem in large networks. In these cases, group key management 
(GKM), in which a trusted, central key distributor (KD) distributes keys over the net-
work, may be more efficient. Since the KD has to maintain only one long-term secret key 
for each member, and each member has to maintain only one long-term SA with the KD, 
the overall number of keys is O(n), thus making it more manageable. Since NASPInet 
must account for multiple PGWs subscribing to a single PGW, GKM is a much more 
efficient option than PKM.  
 
2.2 GKM (Group Key Management) 
In GKM, a trusted KD provides TEKs and the KEK (also known as the group key) to all 
members of the group. As mentioned in the previous section, it is a more efficient option 
than PKM for key management in the NASPInet framework. The fundamental security 
requirement of key management is ensuring that only the intended recipient gets access to 
data. In the case of group key management, the following procedures help in meeting this 
goal: 
1. Member authentication: To prevent any intruder from impersonating a legitimate group 
member, each prospective member must be identified and authenticated to verify that it 
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actually is what it claims to be. 
2. Access control: After authentication, the member’s join operation must be validated to 
control its access to group communication, especially the group key. 
3. Rekeying: The TEK and KEK must be changed at regular intervals to safeguard their 
secrecy. Also, each key must be completely independent from any of the previous ones to 
prevent being formulated from them. 
4. Perfect forward and backward secrecy: Only current group members must be able to 
access data. Hence, old members must be prevented from deciphering messages transmit-
ted after their expulsion. This is called perfect forward secrecy, or leave secrecy. Similar-
ly, new members must be prevented from deciphering messages transmitted prior to their 
membership. This is called perfect backward secrecy, or join secrecy. Rekeying in the 
event of a change in group membership is the principal mechanism employed to maintain 
perfect forward and backward secrecy. 
 
2.3 System Model 
We now describe a group key management model based on the IETF framework. Since a 
single source (sender) multicasts data to multiple receivers, we assume one-to-many mul-
ticast. The entities involved in the model are the KD, member senders and member re-
ceivers. Each member performs key and security association (SA) management functions 
with the KD for delivery and management of data encrypted by the group key. An SA is 
set of security parameters shared by network entities to support secure communication of 
information between them. It may include attributes such as cryptographic algorithm and 
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mode, TEK, and parameters for the network data to be passed over the connection. 
 
The member sender sends encrypted data packets to member receivers on the multicast 
group. The KD also sends control packets, messages containing commands, reminders, 
notifications, etc., to the members via a control channel. The control channel is also used 
for management of TEKs, KEKs, keying material and SAs. The model is shown in Fig. 2.
 
Figure 2: System model for GKM [3] 
 
 
2.4 GSA (Group Security Association) 
A GSA is defined to include an aggregate of three categories of SAs: Categories 1 and 2 
between the KD and a member, and Category 3 among members. 
1. Category 1 SA (or SA1) is required for the bidirectional unicast communication be-
tween the KD and a group member. It is initiated by a member to “pull” GSA infor-
mation, including the SA, keys and the Category 3 SA, from the KD to either join the 
9 
 
group, or rejoin after getting disconnected. Hence, it is also referred to as pull SA or reg-
istration SA. This SA is known only by the KD and the corresponding member. 
2. Category 2 SA (or SA2) is required for the unidirectional multicast transmission of key 
management/control messages from the KD to all group members. Since the control mes-
sages include the update or replacement of SA3, it can be said that SA2 is used to update 
SA3. SA2 is used by the KD to “push” rekeying messages and SA updates to the mem-
bers. Hence, it is also known as push SA or rekey SA. This SA is known by the KD and 
all members. 
3. Category 3 SA (or SA3) is required for the unidirectional multicast transmission from 
member sender to member receivers. Since it is used to secure the data traffic, it is also 
referred to as the data security SA. This SA is known by the KD and all members of the 
group. The processes taking place in a GSA are shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3: GSA definition [3] 
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3.  GDOI (GROUP DOMAIN OF INTERPRETATION) 
 
GDOI [4] is a GSA management protocol. It describes a set of procedures, message ex-
changes, and message payloads that govern the behavior of the entities in a group. GDOI 
messages are used to create, maintain, or delete security associations for a group.  
 
GDOI uses ISAKMP’s notion of domain of interpretation and applies it towards group 
communication. ISAKMP [5] is a key management protocol of the Internet Security Ar-
chitecture (ISA) [6]. It defines the procedures for authenticating a communicating peer, 
creation and management of security associations, and threat mitigation. It thus provides 
a key management framework for transferring key and authentication data, independent 
of the key generation process.  
 
GDOI is a two-phase protocol in which Phase 2 must be protected by Phase 1; i.e., Phase 
2 exchanges may take place only after the Phase 1 exchange has completed. Phase 1, 
used to implement Category 1 SA, authenticates a client (member) to the KD, known as 
group controller/key server (GCKS) in GDOI parlance. GDOI uses the Phase 1 exchange 
from Internet key exchange (IKE) [7] for its own Phase 1 exchange. IKE is a widely de-
ployed key exchange protocol, primarily used for IPsec (Internet Protocol Security). It 
builds upon the Oakley [8] protocol and ISAKMP, and is used to set up SA in the IPsec 
protocol suite. It is especially useful for protecting GDOI keying material as it is able to 
provide [9]: 
i) peer authentication - via pre-shared keys or public key encryption 
ii) confidentiality - via Diffie-Hellman exchange 
11 
 
iii) message integrity 
        a) man-in-the-middle attack protection 
b) replay/reflection attack protection - nonce mechanism, hash-based message au-
thentication code 
c) denial of service protection - cookie mechanism 
 
Phase 2 is newly defined in GDOI to cater to the GSA. It comprises two exchanges: 
GROUPKEY-PULL and GROUPKEY-PUSH. GROUPKEY-PULL, protected by the 
Phase 1 explained above, is responsible for creating Category 2 and Category 3 SAs. It 
enables the member to “pull” KEK and TEK keying material, policy, and attributes from 
the GCKS. The GROUPKEY-PUSH datagram, used to create or modify Category 2 and 
Category 3 SAs, is “pushed” from the GCKS to the members. The KEK protects the 
GROUPKEY-PUSH message. The various message exchanges that take place during the 
two phases of GDOI are shown in Fig. 4. 
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Figure 4: GDOI Phase 2 exchange [3] 
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4.  REPLICATION 
 
High availability and confidentiality of data is one of the key requirements of the 
NASPInet infrastructure. To meet this requirement, the GKM infrastructure must be fault 
tolerant and ensure that network entities have access to TEKs for encrypting or decrypt-
ing data. To provide fault tolerance to the GKM infrastructure, we must eliminate its sin-
gle point-of-failure, the KD. If the KD goes down, senders do not have access to new 
keys for encrypting data, thus compromising availability or confidentiality. Also, the re-
ceivers may not have access to the keys needed for decrypting messages, thus hampering 
availability. One way of preventing the KD’s crash from affecting the system is to main-
tain its replicas, which can replace it as and when needed. We address replication of the 
KD in this work. 
 
Replication, the process of storing data on multiple devices (usually a cluster of servers), 
is one of the most powerful tools to achieve high availability. The server providing a ser-
vice may crash due to environmental hazards, operator errors, or infrastructure failures 
like power outages and software or hardware faults. In such a scenario, it is simply re-
placed by another server from the cluster. The successor is configured based on the state 
of its predecessor and the application is restarted on it. In addition to availability, replica-
tion also enhances system performance and scalability by exploiting locality of reference 
and read-intensive references; local servers store and deliver replicas rather than one 
global server for all the data. If not managed efficiently, replication can lead to issues like 
lack of consistency between the redundant sources, decreased system throughput, dead-
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locks, and security vulnerabilities. We shall now outline the main functionalities which 
must be provided to prevent consistency issues from arising due to replication. The main 
headings of the outline are: I. Atomic broadcast. II. Consensus. III. Leader Election. IV. 
Two-Phased Commit. 
 
I. Atomic Broadcast [10]: Broadcast is the process of a server transmitting messages to 
the remaining servers in the cluster. A broadcast is atomic if it can guarantee that all 
servers in the cluster agree on the messages delivered, and on the order in which they are 
delivered. With this guarantee, consistency is trivially ensured if every operation on a 
replicated server is distributed to all replicas using atomic broadcast. We elucidate the 
conditions required for atomic broadcast, starting from basic broadcast [11]. 
 
1. Basic broadcast: A correct server would eventually deliver the message, where a cor-
rect server is one that has not crashed. Here, a sender delivering the message means the 
receiver receiving it. 
 
2. Reliable broadcast: satisfies the following three properties: 
i) Agreement: All correct servers deliver the same set of messages; i.e., if a correct server 
delivers a message m, then all correct servers eventually deliver m. Hence, a message is 
either delivered by all correct servers, or by none of them. 
ii) Validity: This set includes all messages sent by the correct servers; i.e., if a correct 
server sends (broadcasts) a message m, the server will eventually deliver m. 
iii) Integrity: Each message delivered from the set is identical to the one sent by its send-
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er; i.e., for any message m, every correct server delivers m at most once and only if it was 
previously sent by its sender. 
 
3. Ordered broadcast: 
i) FIFO ordering: Messages are delivered in the order that they were sent; i.e., if a server 
sent message m1 before sending m2, then all correct servers deliver m1 before m2. 
ii) Causal ordering: Each message is delivered only after all the messages it depends on 
have been delivered; i.e., if message m2 depends on message m1 (m1 causally precedes 
m2), then all correct servers deliver m2 only after they have delivered m1. 
iii) Total ordering: All correct servers deliver all messages in the same order, and hence 
have the same “view” of the system; i.e., if a correct server delivers m1 before m2, then 
any other correct server that delivers m2 will deliver it only after delivering m1.   
 
4. Atomic broadcast: A reliable totally-ordered broadcast is called an atomic broadcast. 
 
II. Consensus   
The consensus problem is for each server to propose a value in the form of a packet, a 
sequence of bytes, and for all of them to agree on one from those proposed. The agree-
ment ensures consistency and is reached by voting. The minimum number of votes re-
quired for agreement is called a quorum. Usually quorums are required to have a majority 
number of servers. Quorums satisfying the aforementioned condition are called majority 
quorums. The unit of agreement is reached upon by exchanging packets with a quorum of 
servers is called a proposal. Common examples of consensus include totally ordered 
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broadcast, in which the processes agree on the order of message delivery, and leader elec-
tion, in which the servers agree on the leader. 
 
III. Leader Election 
In most clusters designed for high availability, the requests are processed by one master 
replica, known as the leader. The process of choosing the leader from among nominees is 
called election. The leader must be unique, and is therefore usually chosen as the one 
with the largest identifier (ID), which may be any useful value, as long as it is unique and 
totally ordered. The participants in the voting process must agree on the leader. They do 
so by deciding on the proposal with the highest ID. If at any point in time the current 
leader wishes to retire, then its replacement is found by the means of another election. 
The exact sequence of steps is as follows: 
i) The leader (or nominee) sends each of its followers a NEW_LEADER proposal. 
ii) The follower (or participant) acknowledges or ACKs the proposal. 
iii) The new leader will COMMIT the proposal once a quorum of followers have ACKed 
it. 
iv) The follower will commit any state it received from the leader when the 
NEW_LEADER proposal is COMMITED. 
v) The new leader starts accepting new proposals only after the NEW_LEADER proposal 
has been COMMITED. 
 
If an election terminates erroneously, the leader will not have quorum and hence the 
NEW_LEADER proposal would not be committed. At this point, the leader and its re-
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maining followers will timeout and go back to election. It is also important to note that if 
a follower has proposals with IDs higher than that of the leader, they will be discarded. 
The rationale behind this is that since the leader, by definition, has the highest ID, the 
follower must have arrived after the election (or else it would have become the leader). 
Since the leader itself has not seen the proposal, it could not have sent it to the quorum. 
Hence, these proposals cannot be committed and are discarded. Therefore, the leader es-
tablishes an ID to start using for new proposals by setting its ID to be 1 more than the 
currently highest ID. This allows us to skip blocks of uncommitted proposals and not 
worry about duplicate proposals for a given ID. 
 
IV. Two-Phased Commit 
If a process crashes after sending its proposal to one set of servers, but before sending it 
to the other, the two sets of servers would not be able to decide the same value. The solu-
tion to this problem is atomic commit - the proposal is committed by either all servers or 
none. This ensures that none of the updates are partial. 
 
A transaction comes to an end when a server requests it to be committed. A simple way 
to perform atomic commit is to keep communicating the commit request to all servers till 
they acknowledge that they have carried out the same. It is impossible to reach consensus 
in an asynchronous system if a node undergoes failure [12]. The two-phase commit pro-
tocol manages to reach consensus in asynchronous systems even in presence of a failure 
by masking it. It does so by replacing a crashed process with a new one whose state is set 
from information from other processes or saved in storage. In the first phase (voting 
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phase), the leader asks the followers if they are ready to commit. Once it gets an affirma-
tive response from a quorum of followers, it moves into the second phase (completion 
phase), telling them to commit. 
 
The entire process comprises the following individual steps: 
i) The leader sends proposals to its followers in the order that it receives requests. 
ii) The followers receive proposals in the order that the leader sent them, process messag-
es in the order that they receive proposals, and send an ACK to the leader in the order 
that they process messages. 
iii) The leader receives ACKs from followers in the order that they sent it. Once it re-
ceives ACKS from a quorum, it issues a COMMIT to all followers. 
iv) The followers process COMMITs and deliver the proposal message. 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
5. ZOOKEEPER 
 
In the previous section, we described the functionalities required for ensuring consistency 
when performing replication. The complexity of coordination necessitates a service that 
can handle the coordination issues, while exposing an intuitive interface to the user. 
ZooKeeper [13] is one such service for coordinating processes of distributed applications 
with a user-friendly API. It is used by Yahoo! for its Fetching Service and Message Bro-
ker services, and by non-Yahoo! applications like Katta. Unlike Google’s offering, 
Chubby, ZooKeeper does not make use of blocking primitives since they can cause slow 
or faulty clients to hamper the performance of faster ones. As a result, it is able to expose 
a wait-free and event-driven interface which enables the service implementation to have 
high-performance and fault tolerance. The performance aspects of ZooKeeper allow it to 
be used in large distributed systems, and the reliability aspects prevent it from becoming 
the single point of failure in big systems. Since it guarantees FIFO client ordering of all 
operations and linearizable writes, it meets the criteria to perform coordination. 
 
ZooKeeper provides the user with primitives and guarantees, which we now outline un-
der  the following main headings: I. Sessions. II. Data Model. III. Guarantees. 
 
I. Sessions 
The ZK service comprises a set of servers, called ensemble, each of which must know 
about the rest. The service is available as long as the majority of the servers in the en-
semble are available. A client connects to the ZooKeeper service and initiates a session. 
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Clients submit requests to ZK through the client API. The client library is responsible for 
exposing the ZK service interface through the client API as well as managing the network 
connections between the client and ZK servers. The client creates a handle to the 
ZooKeeper service using the list of servers in the ensemble. The ZooKeeper client library 
will pick an arbitrary server from the list and try to connect to it, transitioning the handle 
to CONNECTING state. If this connection fails, or if the client becomes disconnected 
from the server for any reason, the client will automatically try the next server in the list, 
until a connection is (re-)established, transitioning the handle from CONNECTING to 
CONNECTED state. During normal operation the handle is in one of these two states. 
Once connected to the service, the client library maintains a TCP connection between the 
client and the server through which the client sends requests, gets responses, gets watch 
events, and sends heartbeats. If an unrecoverable error occurs, such as session expiration 
or authentication failure, or if the application explicitly closes the handle, the handle 
moves to the CLOSED state. 
 
II. Data Model    
  
1. Znodes 
ZooKeeper has a hierarchial name space, much like a file system, in which each node can 
have data associated with it as well as children. These nodes in the ZooKeeper data tree 
are referred to as znodes, as shown in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5: Zookeeper data model – znodes and namespace hierarchy [14] 
 
The servers maintain an in-memory image of the data tree along with transaction logs and 
snapshots in a persistent store. Because the data is kept in memory, ZooKeeper is able to 
provide its clients with high throughput, low latency, highly available, strictly ordered 
access to the znodes. Paths to znodes are expressed as canonical, absolute, slash-
separated paths. Znodes maintain a stat structure that includes time stamps as well as ver-
sion numbers for data or acl changes. These allow ZooKeeper to validate the cache and to 
coordinate updates. Each time a znode's data changes, the version number increases. For 
instance, whenever a client retrieves data, it also receives the version of the data. And 
when a client performs an update or a delete, it must supply the version of the data of the 
znode it is changing. If the version it supplies does not match the actual version of the 
data, the update will fail. 
 
i) Watches 
Clients have the option of setting a watch on a znode while performing read operations. 
Watches are one time triggers; once a client gets a watch event and wants to get notified 
of future changes, it must set another watch. Because watches are one time triggers and 
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there is latency between getting the event and sending a new request to get a watch, the 
znode may change multiple times between getting the event and setting the watch again. 
When a client disconnects from a server (for example, when the server fails), it will not 
get any watches until the connection is reestablished. For this reason session events are 
sent to all outstanding watch handlers, which can be used to go into a safe mode:  The 
client does not receive events while disconnected, so its process should act conservatively 
in that mode. 
 
With regard to watches, ZooKeeper maintains these guarantees: 
a) Watches are ordered with respect to other events, other watches, and asynchronous 
replies. The ZooKeeper client libraries ensures that everything is dispatched in order. 
b) A client will see a watch event for a znode it is watching before seeing the new data 
that corresponds to that znode. 
c) The order of watch events from ZooKeeper corresponds to the order of the updates as 
seen by the ZooKeeper service. 
 
ii) Data Access 
The data stored at each znode in a namespace is read and written atomically - reads get 
all the data bytes associated with a znode and a write replaces all the data. Each node has 
an access control list (ACL) that restricts who can do what by specifying sets of IDs and 
permissions that are associated with those IDs. When a client connects to ZooKeeper and 
authenticates itself, ZooKeeper associates all the IDs that correspond to a client with the 
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client’s connection. These ids are checked against the ACLs of znodes when a client tries 
to access a node. An ACL pertains only to a specific znode, not to its children. 
 
Read requests sent by a ZooKeeper client are processed locally at the ZooKeeper server 
to which the client is connected. If the read request registers a watch on a znode, that 
watch is also tracked locally at the ZooKeeper server. Write requests are forwarded to 
other ZooKeeper servers and go through consensus before a response is generated. Sync 
requests are also forwarded to another server, but do not actually go through consensus. 
Thus, the throughput of read requests is directly proportional and that of write requests is 
inversely proportional to the number of servers. 
 
iii) Ephemeral Nodes 
ZooKeeper also has the notion of ephemeral nodes. These znodes exists as long as the 
session that created the znode is active. When the session ends the znode is deleted. Be-
cause of this behavior ephemeral znodes are not allowed to have children. 
 
2. Time in ZooKeeper  
ZooKeeper tracks time multiple ways: 
i) Zxid - Every change to the ZooKeeper state receives a stamp in the form of a 
ZooKeeper Transaction Id (zxid). Each change will have a unique zxid and maintain total 
ordering; i.e., zxid1 < zxid2 => 1 happened before 2. 
ii) Version numbers - Every change to a node increments its version number by 1. There 
is a version number associated with change in data (version), children (cversion), and 
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ACL (aversion). 
iii) Ticks - When using multi-server ZooKeeper, servers use ticks to define timing of 
events such as status uploads, session timeouts, connection timeouts between peers, etc. 
The tick time is only indirectly exposed (half the minimum session timeout); if a client 
requests a session timeout less than the minimum session timeout, the server will tell the 
client that the session timeout is actually the minimum session timeout. 
iv) Real time - ZooKeeper uses real time, or clock time, to put timestamps only during 
znode creation or modification. 
 
III. Guarantees 
1. Ordering guarantees: 
i) Linearizable writes: Since ZooKeeper uses an atomic broadcast protocol, Zab [15], all 
requests that update the state of ZooKeeper are serializable and respect precedence. In 
addition to the guarantees provided by regular atomic broadcast, Zab also guarantees that 
changes broadcast by a leader are delivered in the order they were sent and all changes 
from the previous leaders are delivered to an established leader before it broadcasts its 
own changes. Also, since TCP is used for transport, message order is maintained by the 
network. The entire process from request to response is shown in Fig. 6. 
ii) FIFO client order: All requests from a given client are executed in the order that they 
were sent by the client. This enables clients to submit operations asynchronously, and 
hence have multiple outstanding operations at a time. Hence, the linearizability in this 
scenario is called A-linearizability (asynchronous linearizability). This is different from 
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the original definition of linearizability [16], in which a client may only have one out-
standing operation at a time. 
 
Figure 6: The write requests are sent to the leader which transmits it to its followers via atomic 
broadcast [14] 
 
2. Consistency guarantees: 
i) Sequential Consistency: Due to the total ordering guarantee, updates from a client will 
be applied in the order that they were sent. 
ii) Atomicity: ZooKeeper messaging is very similar to two-phased commit. Hence, up-
dates either succeed or fail - there are no partial results. 
iii) Single System Image: A client will see the same view of the service regardless of the 
server that it connects to. 
iv) Reliability: Once an update has been applied, it will persist from that time forward 
until a client overwrites the update. This guarantee has two corollaries: 
a) If a client gets a successful return code, the update will have been applied. On some 
failures (communication errors, timeouts, etc.) the client will not know if the update has 
applied or not. ZooKeeper takes steps to minimize the failures, but the only guarantee is 
only present with successful return codes. 
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b) Any updates that are seen by the client, through a read request or successful update, 
will never be rolled back when recovering from server failures. 
v) Timeliness: The clients view of the system is guaranteed to be up-to-date within a cer-
tain time bound (on the order of tens of seconds). Either system changes will be seen by a 
client within this bound, or the client will detect a service outage. 
 
Due to the consistency guarantees, ZooKeeper can serve older data on receiving a read 
request. As a result, reads are faster than writes. Also, using these consistency guarantees, 
it is easy to build higher level functions such as leader election, barriers, queues, and 
read/write revocable locks solely at the ZooKeeper client. 
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6. DESIGN 
 
We now describe how we can use ZooKeeper to provide replication services for GDOI. 
The GDOI controllers (operational and backup) and the GDOI members act as ZK cli-
ents, connecting to the ZK service, as shown in Fig. 7. Phase 1 of GDOI deals with au-
thenticating a client before granting it membership. To prevent re-authentication, we save 
the SA information of this client to be used for verification in future. Phase 1 authentica-
tion involves trust establishment between the GKD (or whatever it is called here) and the 
group member, and the interaction in our approach is identical to the one in the original 
GDOI protocol. 
 
Figure 7: Architecture to use ZooKeeper for replicating GDOI GCKS 
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In Phase 2, the operational controller updates the keys by performing write operations, 
while the members receive these updates by performing read operations. In the event that 
the operational controller goes offline, one of the backup controllers becomes the new 
operational controller. Since the state of the system is maintained by the ZK service, the 
new operational controller can continue from where the previous one left off. 
 
ZK service comprises a set of servers called the ensemble. All the servers in the ensemble 
must know about each other. They maintain an in-memory image of state, along with 
transaction logs and snapshots in a persistent store. The ZK service will be available as 
long as a majority of the servers are available. 
 
We begin with the first phase of ZK messaging, leader activation. In this phase, ZK elects 
a leader from the ensemble and waits for followers to connect to the leader. The ensemble 
is now ready for the second phase of ZK messaging, active messaging. In this phase, the 
elected leader accepts messages to propose and coordinates their delivery to its followers, 
as shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: All requests received by the service are forwarded to the leader, which then sends out mes-
sage proposals to its followers for agreement [14] 
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The operational controller now connects to the ZK service. A ZK client must have a con-
nection string containing a comma-separated list of host/port pairs, each corresponding to 
a server in the ZK ensemble. Once connected to the ZK service, the operational controller 
creates a regular znode and an ephemeral znode in the data tree. We refer to the regular 
znode as the TEK znode and the ephemeral znode as the expiry znode. Our motivation 
for making the expiry znode ephemeral will become clear in the following paragraph. 
The operational controller now sends the connection string and the path names of the 
expiry znode to each backup controller. 
 
Using the connection string sent to them by the operational controller, the backup con-
trollers connect to the service and set a watch on the ephemeral znode created by the op-
erational controller. In the event that the operational controller suffers a crash and fails to 
recover within the session timeout, the session is said to have expired. On session expira-
tion, all ephemeral znodes associated with the session are deleted and all clients watching 
the znode are notified of the change. Hence, if the operational controller fails to recover 
within session timeout, backup controllers are notified of the same, and the next available 
one in the predetermined succession order takes over. 
 
Now, the operational controller listens for incoming requests from prospective members, 
authenticated by Phase I. Upon receiving a request, it launches a separate thread for the 
particular member. 
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In each thread, the controller reads data from the respective member to check whether the 
request made is to join or leave the group. In the event of a join request, it creates a znode 
in the ZK object data tree with a unique path name. This is the member’s KEK znode. 
The controller adds the member’s authentication credentials to the ACL of its KEK and 
TEK znodes. It then sends the connection string and the path names of the TEK and KEK 
znodes to the member and starts updating the KEK and TEK periodically. ZK ensures 
that once an update has been applied, it will persist until a client overwrites it. This means 
that if the controller gets a successful return code, the update has been applied. Also, 
since the broadcast is atomic, all of the data is written and hence local replicas in the 
server database never diverge.   
 
TEK updates are frequent, but require performing a write operation on only one znode. 
KEK updates require performing a write operation on every znode of the group, but do 
not occur frequently. Hence, TEK updates are frequent but involve performing a compu-
tationally low-cost operation, and KEK updates involve performing a computationally 
high-cost operation, but occur occasionally. Therefore, the computational cost of the pro-
cess is relatively low for the most part with occasional spikes.  
 
The member, now connected to the controller and receiving information from it, connects 
to the ZK service using the connection string. Since the member’s credentials match 
those in the ACL of its KEK and the TEK znodes, it can read data from the particular 
znode. The member sets a watch on the TEK and KEK znodes. Every time the controller 
writes an update to either of them, the watch set on it is triggered, sending a notification 
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to the member. The member reads the update, resetting the watch for the next update, and 
makes a note of it in its log. Since updates from a client are applied in the order that they 
were sent, the members receive keys in the order that the controller sent them. Also, since 
the read and write operations are atomic, i.e., write replaces all the data in a znode and 
read receives all the data associated with it, the results are always complete, never partial. 
Furthermore, since ZK guarantees a single system image—i.e., a client will see the same 
view of the system irrespective of the server it connects to—it is going to be the same 
key. Also, if a member gets disconnected, upon reconnection it will view the same state 
as earlier.  
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7. ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we elucidate the advantages of running GDOI with ZooKeeper as a repli-
cation service over running GDOI on its own. 
 
1. Increased availability 
As mentioned earlier, GDOI has a single point of failure: the GCKS. Since GCKS is the 
only entity that is responsible for key distribution, if it crashes, members are unable to 
receive any keys until it recovers from the crash and starts to function again. In the repli-
cated model, the backup controllers can take the place of the operational controller in the 
event of its failure. The design provides for the replacement by a backup controller to be 
quicker than the recovery of the operational controller. 
 
2. Eliminating need for re-authentication 
In GDOI, when a GCKS resumes operations after recovering from a crash, it must estab-
lish new TEKs and KEK. This off-schedule update makes the member realize that the 
GCKS had crashed. On the other hand, in our proposed design, since key updates are 
time stamped, the GCKS does not have to send the TEKs and KEK until they are due for 
the update. This not only saves GCKS from the computationally intensive process of 
brute force key-update upon recovery, but also makes GCKS failure almost invisible to 
the members. Also, since ZooKeeper handles coordination and provides consistency 
guarantees, each backup controller is ensured to have the same view of group member-
ship. 
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3. Higher groupkey-push throughput 
In the GDOI scheme, a single GCKS handles the entire load of providing group members 
with their respective key updates. In the replicated system, the GCKS writes the key up-
dates to the ZooKeeper service, which replicates it across the servers in its ensemble. 
Since the load is now spread over a larger number of servers, the throughput of the 
groupkey-push operation is higher; i.e., more members can receive the groupkey within 
the required time bound. ZooKeeper also performs load balancing, i.e., distributing the 
load evenly among servers, thus maximizing throughput.   
 
4. Ease of implementation 
Replication can lead to problems like inconsistency between redundant sources, dead-
locks, decreased throughput of operations, etc. To prevent such issues from arising, 
providing coordination services is of utmost importance. ZooKeeper provides common 
coordination services such as synchronization, consensus, leader election, etc., thus elim-
inating the need for implementing these from scratch. It exposes a simple API which en-
ables developers to easily implement primitives based on their needs. The client library 
handles network connections, thus absolving the client of managing the same. 
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8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this thesis, we focused on security and availability of data being exchanged between 
the PGWs, as a part of the NASPInet. We highlighted the importance of key management 
for maintaining confidentiality and integrity. We discussed the choice of group key man-
agement over pairwise key management, and discussed GDOI as the suitable protocol for 
implementing the same. We described the need for replication to ensure high availability, 
and the conditions that must be met for the replicated system to be dependable. We pro-
posed the use of ZooKeeper for replication, explained its internal workings and the primi-
tives provided by its API, and how it can be used to provide a dependable replicated sys-
tem. We finally proposed a design for the interface that can allow GDOI to use ZooKeep-
er as a replication service. 
 
For future work, we would like to verify that running GDOI on ZooKeeper can not only 
provide high availability, but also meet the performance benchmarks as specified by 
NASPInet. We intend to do so by running it on a large-scale network simulator. Specifi-
cally, we would like to quantify and minimize the following parameters: 
i) the percentage of updates read incorrectly by the member 
ii) the time elapsed between the controller writing an update to the ZooKeeper service 
and the member reading that update 
iii) the time elapsed between the operational controller going down and a backup control-
ler taking its place 
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